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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 970035-CA

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

Priority No. 2

GRANT DION BARNES,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF T55 PRQCSSPXffSS
Defendant Grant Dion Barnes appeals his convictions for
burglary, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-202 (1995), and theft, a third degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995), in the Second Judicial
District Court, Davis County, the Honorable Glen R. Dawson,
presiding.

This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant

to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
1.

Was defendant convicted of burglary and theft on the

basis of insufficient evidence?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

When an appeal from a bench trial is

based on the insufficiency of the evidence, this Court applies a
"clearly erroneous" standard.
431 (Utah 1989).

State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424,

This standard requires that the trial court!s

verdict be reversed only if it is against the clear weight of the
evidence or "if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite
and firm conclusion that a mistake has been made."

Id. at 431-32.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The text of all constitutional provisions, statutes, and
rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues before this Court
is contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT 0? TOS CASg
On June 24, 1996, defendant was charged by information with
one count of burglary, a third degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann, § 76-6-202 (1995), one count of theft, a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995) ,
and one count of possession of burglary tools, a class 3
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-205 (1995)
(R. 8-11).
Following a bench trial on October 3, 1996, defendant was
convicted of burglary and theft (R. 27-28, 128-32) .x

The

district court sentenced defendant to serve concurrent terms of
zero-to-five years in the Utah State Prison and imposed a $5000
fine for each offense (R. 28, 30-31, 134-35).

This appeal ensued

(R. 32-35).
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
On appeal from a criminal bench trial, the facts are
reviewed in the light most favorable to the trial courtfs
verdict.

State v. Reed, 839 P.2d 878, 878 (Utah App. 1992)

(citing State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1153 (Utah 1991)).

1

Defendant was found not guilty of possession of burglary
tools (R. 28, 131-32); consequently, that charge is not involved
in this appeal.
2

On the night of June 22, 1996, a burglary and theft occurred
at Mesa Moving and Storage (Mesa) in North Salt Lake, Utah.

At

the time of the crimes, David Kolesky, an employee of Mesa, was
on the premises (R. 61) . On that night, he left the building
after the alarm had been set and appeared to be working properly
(R. 63) . He drove from his parking space in the back of the
building around to the front of the building to make sure
everything was okay there (id.).

He heard the alarm go off and

saw a vehicle with a large object in the back leaving the scene
at a high rate of speed (R. 61, 63) . He then saw the vehicle run
a stop sign and witnessed a police car turn on its siren and
pursue the vehicle (R. 61).
Shortly thereafter, police officers arrived at Mesa and
began to investigate the premises with Kolesky (±sL,) • They
discovered that a side door had been jimmied open with what
appeared from the pry marks to be a crow bar (R. 61, 63, 81). A
vending machine and a change machine that sat on top of it, both
of which had been located on a platform up a small flight of
stairs inside the jimmied door, were missing (R. 61, 63, 82).
The vending and change machines were bound together by a steel
cable and weighed somewhere between thirty and eighty pounds
(R. 70, 72, 88). The two machines in tandem were thirty-one
inches wide, about two-and-a-half feet tall, and about
two-and-a-half to three feet deep (R. 90-91).

Kolesky told the

officers that the large object he had seen in the speeding
vehicle seemed to match the missing machines (R. 61).
3

Meanwhile, other officers chased the speeding vehicle
through North Salt Lake and into Salt Lake City (R. 62, 65-68) .
The chase eventually ended in a crash with a police vehicle
(R. 62, 69) . Just prior to the crash, defendant, who had been in
the passenger side of the front seat of the vehicle, fled from
the vehicle on foot (R. 62, 66, 69) . Defendant was eventually
apprehended by Salt Lake City police officers (R. 62) , and both
he and the driver of the vehicle, Stephen Phillip Murphy, were
subsequently arrested (R. 69-70).
Following the crash, the officers recovered the vending and
change machines from the vehicle (R. 70-71).

The fair market

value of the vending and change machines, along with the money
and candy contained therein, was stipulated to be in excess of
$1000, but less than $2000 (R. 62, 86) .2 The officers also
discovered a screwdriver and a crow bar behind the driver's seat
in the vehicle (R. 70) . The crow bar had traces of paint on it
which were the same color as the paint on the area around the
door that had been jimmied open (R. 81-83).
At trial, there was conflicting testimony as to whether the
vending and change machines could be carried by one person.
Although Officer Beckstrand testified that he carried the
machines by himself, he noted that they were awkward to carry by

2

This fact is significant because it is determinative as to
whether the theft involved is a second or third degree felony, or
a class A or B misdemeanor. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (Supp.
1997) . Because the property taken here was valued at more than
$1000, but less than $5000, the defendant was charged with and
convicted of a third degree felony. See id. at (1)(b)(i).
4

oneself and that he needed to put them down in order to open
doors (R. 72-73) . Additionally, Terry Tuke, the owner of the
vending and change machines, testified that he needed another
individual to assist him in carrying the machines and that the
machines were awkward to move by oneself (R. 89). Tuke
specifically noted that the reason for the awkwardness was not so
much the weight of the machines, but their dimensions, and that
moving the machines down these particular stairs by oneself would
be difficult (id.).

On the other hand, Murphy, who testified on

behalf of the defendant, claimed that he took the machines
himself without any assistance from defendant (R. 95-97).
However, the trial court expressly found that Murphy's testimony
was not credible (R. 130). In fact, the trial judge specifically
stated:
all.

"Frankly, I didn't believe [Murphy's] version of this at

I sat here and watched him face to face and listened to his

story and I assessed him to be totally incredible with regard to
the events that happened late that evening" (id.).
Murphy additionally testified that at the time of the
incidents in question, he was employed as a contract laborer with
Mesa and had been so employed for three to four years (R. 93) .
He claimed that he and defendant had gone to Mesa that night to
leave a note for his boss to let him know where he could be
reached to line up work for the next day (R. 94). However, not
only did this testimony differ from his earlier testimony that it
was his usual practice for him to call Mesa to line up work
(R. 93) , but he also gave conflicting testimony as to whether any
5

note actually existed (Compare R. 95 with R. 104) . Murphy
further testified that the stolen machines were outside, not
inside, the building, although he contradicted himself as to the
exact location of the machines (Compare R. 95, lines 3-9 with id.
at lines 13-14).

Lastly, it was stipulated at trial that neither

Murphy nor defendant had permission to be on the premises of Mesa
on the night in question (R. 85) •
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In order to obtain a reversal on appeal based on the
insufficiency of the evidence, defendant must, first, marshal all
of the evidence supporting the trial court's verdict and, second,
demonstrate how this evidence, viewed in the light most favorable
to the verdict, is insufficient to support the verdict.
done neither here.

He has

Defendant has clearly failed to meet this

Court's marshaling requirement by virtually ignoring all of the
stipulations between the parties that help to establish certain
elements of both offenses. Moreover, even if defendant had
properly marshaled the evidence, his appeal nonetheless fails
because the evidence is plainly sufficient to support the trial
court's verdict.

Accordingly, defendant's conviction is entitled

to affirmance on appeal.
AROTMSNT
I. THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS FOR BURGLARY AND THEFT.
On appeal, defendant asserts that the evidence was
insufficient to support the trial court's verdict convicting him
of burglary and theft.

As this Court has previously noted, "[a]
6

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence presents the
defendant with a heavy burden."
819 (Utah App. 1994).

State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810,

In order to meet that burden, the

defendant must (1) marshal all of the evidence supporting the
trial court's verdict and (2) demonstrate how this evidence, even
viewed in the most favorable light, is insufficient to support
the verdict.

State v. Moosman. 794 P.2d 474, 475-76 (Utah 1990);

accord strain, 885 P.2d at 819; State v. Scheel, 823 p.2d 470,
472 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Perdue. 813 P.2d 1201, 1207 (Utah
App. 1991).

This Court will reverse a verdict on the basis of

insufficiency of the evidence only if the evidence is so
inconclusive or so inherently improbable that the trial court
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that defendant committed
the crime.

Strain, 885 P.2d at 819 (citing State v, Goddard, 871

P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994)).
A*

Failure to Marshal

It is well settled that the appellant has the duty of
marshaling the evidence in an appeal based of the sufficiency of
the evidence.

See. e.g.. Strain, 885 P.2d at 819; S£iL££l, 823

P.2d at 472; Eexdll£, 813 P.2d at 1207; Moosman, 794 P.2d
at 475-76.

Moreover, the failure of defendant to meet his

marshaling burden will result in this Court's refusal to consider
his sufficiency of the evidence claim on appeal.

See, e.g.,

State v. Farrow. 919 P.2d 50, 53 n.l (Utah App. 1996); State v.
Mincy, 838 P.2d 648, 652 n.l (Utah App.), cert, denied. 843 P.2d
1042 (Utah 1992); State v. Moore. 802 P.2d 732, 738-39 (Utah App.
7

1990); accord One Tnt' 1 (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp,. 350
P.2d 447, 454 n.25 (Utah 1993); Scharf v. BUG Corp. . 700 P.2d
1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).
In the present case, defendant has plainly failed to meet
this Court's marshaling requirement.

Specifically, in his brief

on appeal, he virtually ignores the various stipulations reached
by the parties prior to and during trial.

For instance, several

of these stipulations concern what David Kolesky, an employee of
Mesa who was on the premises that night, saw and heard.

This

evidence is integral to the foundation of the elements of both
the burglary and theft charges.
to 15.

See Section K B ) inf^a* at 10

Similarly, defendant overlooks the parties1 stipulation

that neither Murphy nor defendant had permission to be on the
premises of Mesa on the night in question, evidence which goes
directly to the issue of whether they were lawfully present
there, another element of the burglary charge.

Accordingly,

because defendant has failed to meet his marshaling burden, this
Court should refuse to consider his sufficiency of the evidence
claim on appeal.

See Farrow, 919 P.2d at 53 n.l; Min^:, 838 P.2d

at 652 n.l; Moorer 802 P.2d at 739.
B.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

Even if this Court declines to dismiss defendant's appeal on
the basis of his failure to marshal the evidence supporting the
trial court's verdict, defendant's appeal nonetheless fails
because the evidence below is clearly sufficient to support
defendant's convictions for burglary and theft.
8

On appeal from a bench trial based on the insufficiency of
the evidence, this Court applies a "clearly erroneous" standard.
State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 431 (Utah 1989).

Under this

standard, the trial court's verdict is reversed only if it is
against the clear weight of the evidence or "if the appellate
court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conclusion that a
mistake has been made,"

Id. at 431-32.

In other words, this

Court will reverse a verdict on the basis of insufficiency of the
evidence only if the evidence is so inconclusive or so inherently
improbable that the trier of fact must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that defendant committed the crime.

Strain/ 885

P.2d at 819 (citing Goddard, 871 P.2d at 543).
As to circumstantial evidence, the Utah Supreme Court has
previously held that such evidence may be sufficient to establish
the guilt of the accused so long as it is of such quality and
quantity as to justify the trier of fact in determining guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 332

(Utah 1991); accord State v. Nickles. 728 P.2d 123, 126-27 (Utah
1986); State v. Barlow, 851 P.2d 1191, 1193 (Utah App.), cert.
denied, 859 P.2d 585) (Utah 1993).

Moreover, " [i]t is not this

court's duty to measure conflicting evidence or the credibility
of witnesses.
of fact. . . .

That responsibility belongs strictly to the trier
f

So long as there is some evidence, including

reasonable inferences, from which findings of all requisite
elements of the crime can reasonably be made, [this CourtTs]
inquiry stops.1"

State v. Lactod, 761 P.2d 23, 27 (Utah App.
9

1988) (quoting State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985)
(citation omitted)); accord State v. Warden. 813 P.2d 1146, 1150
(Utah 1991); State v. Pendergrassr 803 P.2d 1261, 1267-68 (Utah
App. 1990); see generally State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah
1994) (noting that trial court stands in a superior position from
which to evaluate and weigh evidence and assess credibility of
witnesses).3

Thus, this Court must determine whether there is

some evidence, including reasonable inferences, which supports
the trial court's finding all of the requisite elements of the
burglary and theft charged hereunder Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1995), "[a] person is
guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a
building or any portion of a building with intent to commit a
felony or theft or commit an assault on any person."

Theft, in

turn, is defined by Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995), which

3

Defendant cites Justice Stewart's opinion in State v.
Workmanr 852 P.2d 981 (Utah 1993) for the following proposition:
[T]he role of the reviewing court is to
determine (1) whether there is any evidence
that supports each and every element of the
crime charged, and (2) whether the inferences
that can be drawn from that evidence have a
basis in logic and reasonable human
experience sufficient to prove each legal
element of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt. A guilty verdict is not legally valid
if it is based solely on inferences that give
rise to only remote or speculative
possibilities of guilt.
Id. at 985. However, since Justice Stewart1s opinion was joined
by only one other justice, it should not be regarded as the
opinion of the court in that case. Accordingly, insofar as
Justice Stewart's definition of the role of the reviewing court
exceeds the requirements set forth in Span, Nickles. Booker/ and
Warden. it should not be considered binding precedent.
10

provides:

"A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises

unauthorized control over the property of another with a purpose
to deprive him thereof."
In accordance with these statutes, the State must show in
the present case that defendant (1) unlawfully entered Mesa's
building (2) with the intent to commit a theft.

As to the first

element, defendant's unlawful entry into the building, the
State's circumstantial evidence rests largely on the stipulated
testimony of David Kolesky, an employee of Mesa who was on the
premises that night, and on the testimony of various witnesses
concerning whether the vending and change machines could be
carried by one person.
Kolesky1s testimony was that he left the building after the
alarm had been set at which time everything was in order (R. 63) .
After he drove around to the front of the building, the alarm
went off, and then he saw Murphy's vehicle, in which defendant
was a passenger, leave the scene at a high rate of speed
(R. 61, 63) . Shortly thereafter, when he went to investigate the
building with the police, they discovered that a side door had
been j immied open with what appeared from the pry marks to be a
crow bar (R. 61, 63, 81). Later, police officers recovered from
Murphy's vehicle a crow bar with traces of paint on it which were
the same color as the paint on the area around the door that had
been jimmied open (R. 70, 81-83).

This evidence and the

reasonable inferences therefrom, combined with the parties1
stipulation that neither Murphy nor defendant had permission to
11

be on Mesa's premises on the night in question (R. 85), clearly
establish that at least one person in Murphy's vehicle unlawfully
entered Mesa's building that night.
Defendant's unlawful presence in the building is reasonably
drawn from the testimony concerning whether the vending and
change machines, which had been located on a platform up a small
flight of stairs inside the jimmied door, could be carried by one
person.

Terry Tuke, the owner of the machines, testified that

the two machines combined were thirty-one inches wide, about
two-and-a-half feet tall, and about two-and-a-half to three feet
deep (R. 90-91), which dimensions made the machines awkward to
move by oneself (R. 89). Additionally, Tuke testified that
whenever he moved the machines, he needed someone's assistance
and that moving the machines down these specific stairs by
oneself is particularly difficult (id.).

Finally, Officer

Beckstrand, the police officer who recovered the machines,
testified that although he carried the machines by himself, the
machines were awkward to carry by oneself and that he needed to
put them down in order to open doors (R. 72-73) . Given the above
testimony, as well as Kolesky's testimony concerning how quickly
the unlawful entry into the building and taking of the machines
occurred (R. 61, 63), it was a reasonable inference for the trial
court to find that both Murphy and defendant must have unlawfully
entered Mesa's building that night.

Thus, the first element of

the crime of burglary is supported by the evidence here.

12

Additionally, even though Murphy's testimony provided
contrary evidence concerning whether the vending and change
machines could have been carried by him alone, this is not by
itself sufficient to overcome the clear weight of the evidence
standard on appeal.

See, e.g.. Kanten, 813 P.2d at 1150 (holding

that "the mere existence of conflicting evidence . . . does not
warrant reversal"); accord State v. Blubaugh. 904 P.2d 688, 695
(Utah App. 1995), cert, denied, 913 P.2d 749 (Utah 1996).

This

is especially true in light of the fact the trial court did not
find Murphy's testimony credible.

The trial court specifically

stated:

"Frankly, I didn't believe [Murphy's] version of this

at all.

I sat here and watched him face to face and listened to

his story and I assessed him to be totally incredible with regard
to the events that happened late that evening" (R. 130) . Thus,
the mere fact that defendant is able to point to some evidence
that is contrary to the trial court' s finding on this issue does
not establish that the evidence supporting that finding was
insufficient.
Second, as to intent, the Utah Supreme Court has previously
held:

"Burglarious intent 'is a mental state of the actor.

[T] he trier of fact must resort to reasonable inferences based
upon [an] , examination of the surrounding circumstances to
reasonably infer its existence.'"

State v. Porter, 705 P.2d

1174, 1177 (Utah 1985) (quoting Farno v. State. 308 N.E.2d 724,
725 (Ind. App. 1974) (citations omitted)).

"Intent with which an

entry is made is rarely susceptible of direct proof.
13

It is

usually inferred from circumstantial evidence:

the manner of

entry, the time of day, the character and contents of the
building, the person's actions after entry, the totality of the
surrounding circumstances, and the intruder's explanation.n

Id.

"Where the breaking and entering are clearly established and not
controverted, the intent to steal may be sufficiently established
by inference fairly deducible from all the circumstances and need
not be established by direct proof.'1

Id.

Applying Porter to the present case, several factors support
the trial court's finding as to defendant's intent:

first, the

manner of entry was by prying the door open with a crow bar;
second, the incident occurred late at night; and third, Murphy
and defendant's actions after entry, taking the machines and
speeding away, demonstrate their felonious intent in entering the
building.

Accordingly, the trial court's verdict convicting

defendant of burglary is well supported by the evidence and,
therefore, is not clearly erroneous.
Similarly, defendant's conviction of theft is also supported
by the evidence.

In order to establish the elements of the crime

of theft in the present case, the State must show that defendant
(i) obtained or exercised unauthorized control over the property
of another (2) with a purpose to deprive him thereof.

See Utah

Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995) . Much of the evidence outlined above
that supports defendant's burglary conviction likewise supports
the trial court's verdict on defendant's theft charge.

First,

there is Kolesky's stipulated testimony that upon investigation,
14

he discovered that the vending and change machines that had been
located inside the Mesa building were missing (R. 61, 63) .
Second, there is Kolesky's testimony that the large object he had
seen in Murphy's vehicle seemed to match the missing machines
(R. 61). Third, there is all of the evidence supporting the
reasonable inference that defendant and Murphy took the machines
together.

See supra./ at 12. Fourth, there is the manner in

which defendant and Murphy left the scene, to wit, in a speeding
vehicle (R. 61-62, 65). Fifth, there is the evidence that both
defendant and Murphy attempted to evade arrest (R. 62, 65-69) .
See, e.g. . State v. Bales, 675 P.2d 573, 575 (Utah 1983) (flight
after the commission of a crime may be considered by factfinder
in deciding the question of defendant's guilt or innocence).
Lastly, there is the fact that officers recovered the vending and
change machines from Murphy's vehicle (R. 70-71).

Based on all

of this evidence, it is clear that the trial courtfs verdict
convicting defendant of the theft charge was also well supported.
Accordingly, it cannot be said to be clearly erroneous.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, Defendant Grant Dion Barnes's
convictions are entitled to affirmance on appeal.
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